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“The subject of priority in scientific discovery is a prickly one, since original scien-
tific contributions are prized and multiple independent discoveries do occur [Dimand
and Dimand, 1992, 24].” Regarding game theory, in 1713, “James Waldegrave pro-
vided the first minimax mixed strategy solution of a two-person game of strategy”
[ibid., 25], but he made no extension of his solution of the card game le Her to other
games, and John von Neumann [(1928) 1997] deserves the credit for the first general
“proof of the existence of a maximin equilibrium for a broad class of games [Dimand
and Dimand, 1997, xix].”
Similarly, searching for firsts within the range of literature is not easy. Regarding
detective literature, the appearance, in 1841, of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue”,
written by Poe (1809-1849), “marked the birth of the detective story [van Doren Stern,
1977, xxv].” More precisely, Poe’s three detective stories – “The Murders in the Rue
Morgue” [MRM], “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt” [MMR] and “The Purloined Letter”
[PL] 1 – are pioneer works. However, Chevalier Auguste Dupin, the hero of these
three “Tales of Mystery and Ratiocination”, is not the first detective character appear-
ing in a literary work. For example, the central character of Zadig ou la Destinée
[Voltaire, (1747) 1998] has the “quasi-divinatory skills” [Lacassin, 1993, 23] that Poe
gives to Dupin. Moreover, Poe is generally thought to have been influenced by the
Mémoires of François Eugène Vidocq, who in 1817 founded the world’s first detective
bureau, in Paris.
“What is important about Colombus’ discovery of America is not that it was the
first, but that it was the last. After Colombus, America was never lost again” [Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990, 4]. Similarly, what is important about Poe’s discovery of detective
story and von Neumann’s discovery of game theory is that, after Poe and von Neumann,
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In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944, 176-177] illustrated the problem of
strategic interaction by the scene in Conan Doyle’s story “The Final Problem”, in
which Holmes, pursued by the notorious Moriarty, must decide whether to get off his
train at Dover or at Canterbury. Thus, they brought game theory and detective story
together and showed that applying game theory to detective story could potentially
contribute to the development of game theory and its ability to advance economic
analysis. Actually, Morgenstern produced the example of the pursuit of Sherlock
Holmes by Moriarty in his first book [Morgenstern, 1928]. He used this example in
order to solve the problem “of the influence of predictions on the predicted events
[Morgenstern, 1976, 806].” Coincidentally, this analysis “was published the same year
as the proof of the Minimax Theorem” [Brams, 1994a, 37] by von Neumann. In 1935,
Morgenstern published a paper [Morgenstern, (1935) 1976], “in which the same illus-
tration of Sherlock Holmes and Moriarty was used once more, but the whole matter of
prediction and foresight was put into a wider frame [Morgenstern, 1976, 806].”
Brams [1994a, 36] provides a chronological list of twenty-two literary works to
which game theory has been applied. Conan Doyle’s story “The Final Problem” is at
the top of this list that includes Shakespeare’s greatest writings, the Old Testament
and PL. MRM and MMR do not appear on this list.
It is Poe’s trilogy, however, that has laid down the “great concepts upon which all
fictional detection worth the name has been based … [and] … the almost infinite
minutiae” that are the features of the detective story [Haycraft, 1984, 12]. The most
important of these minutiae is “deduction by putting one’s self in another’s position
[ibid.].” Thus, both Poe’s trilogy and game theory are based upon empathy. Moreover,
Poe’s letters contain unique and, at times, detailed information regarding behavior in
strategic situations.
Our paper takes these observations as its starting point. Its purpose is threefold.
First, we show that Dupin, as a private detective, thinks like a game theorist. To this
end, we sum up and deepen analyzes of PL provided elsewhere, and we prove, as an
original attempt, that MRM and MMR, as well as PL are filled with ratiocination that
can be modeled according to game theory. Second, we briefly elaborate on a bargain-
ing game that turns the three Dupin stories into a real trilogy, and we show that
Dupin, as a negotiator, has learned the value of both putting himself in the other
person’s shoes and looking several moves ahead. Third, we show that Poe, as well as
Dupin, thought like a game theorist. Two decisions of Poe had a great impact on his
life: as a young man, he left his foster father’s home; as a forty-year-old man, he took
and published a temperance oath. We prove that these two very important decisions
of Poe are consistent with game-theoretic behavior.
GAME THEORY AND EACH ONE OF THE THREE DUPIN STORIES
Chevalier August Dupin, the detective character created by Poe is the precursor
of a long line of fictional sleuths. When he created this character, Poe “projected an
idealization of himself as he would like to have been – a cool, infallible thinking ma-
chine that brought the power of reason to bear on all of life’s problems and trium-
phantly solving them” [van Doren Stern, 1977, 330]. Poe was a man of superior intel-99 GAME THEORY AND POE'S DETECTIVE STORIES AND LIFE
lect. He had a gift for subtle reasoning and ratiocination. For example, in 1841, he
foretold the solution of the murder mystery of Dickens’ Barnaby Rudge [Quinn, 1941,
332]. Thus, in each one of the Poe’s three “tales of mystery and ratiocination”, Dupin
has remarkable deductive powers.
Dupin versus a blackmailer
In PL, Poe’s only detective story that does not deal with death or violence, Dupin
is called upon to find a letter which an unscrupulous Minister is known to have stolen
from the Queen. The disclosure of this document to the King would bring in question
the honour of the Queen. “This fact gives the holder of the document an ascendancy
over the illustrious personage … [because of] … the robber’s knowledge of the loser’s
knowledge of the robber [PL, 442].” The Queen is thoroughly convinced of the neces-
sity of reclaiming her letter, and she commits the matter to G, the Prefect of the
Parisian police. G “investigates every nook and corner of the premises in which it is
possible that the paper can be concealed [PL, 444].” These investigations fail, and G
engages the services of Dupin. The latter manages to steal the letter from the Minis-
ter and hand it over to G.
In order to describe to his admiring foil the way he took back from the Minister
the letter that the Minister had stolen from the Queen, Dupin uses the game of “even
and odd”: “This game is simple, and is played with marbles. One player holds in his
hand a number of these toys, and demands of another whether that number is even or
odd. If the guess is right, the guesser wins one; if wrong, he loses one [PL, 450].”
Guilbaud [1949; 1954, Ch. III; 1997], Lacan [1966], Davis [1970] and Brams [1994a;
1994b] analyzed this game. According to Dupin, the game he plays against the Minis-
ter is similar to the game of “even and odd.”
Let us assume that both players are intelligent: each one “knows everything that
we know about the game and he can make any inferences about the situation that we
can make” [Myerson, 1991, 4]. Then, we can model this situation by the non-coopera-
tive static game of complete and imperfect information, the normal-form of which is
shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
The Normal-Form Representation of the
Player (Minister) / Opponent (Dupin) Game
   O  (D) 
   e  (c)  o  (n) 
e (c)  -1, 1 1 , -1 
P (M) 
o (n)  1, -1  -1, 1 100 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In this bi-matrix, P, O, e and o denote respectively the player who conceals an
even or an odd number of marbles in his hand, the opponent, and the two actions –
even or odd – that are available to P, and that O has to guess; M, D, c and n denote
respectively the Minister, Dupin and the two actions – to conceal the purloined letter
or to resort “to the comprehensive and sagacious expedient of not attempting to con-
ceal it at all” [PL, 458] – that are available to M, and that D has to guess.
After expounding his analysis of “even and odd”, Dupin tells his friend about a
game of puzzles, in which “one party playing requires another to find a given word …
upon the motley and perplexed surface of the chart [PL, 457].” According to Dupin, in
such a game, a novice “generally seeks to embarrass his opponents by giving them the
most minutely lettered names; but the adept selects such words as stretch, in large
characters, from one end of the chart to the other [ibid.].” This game looks like the
games used by Schelling [1963] to illustrate the notion of focal point: all these games
are played upon a map, and, at all these games, “poets may do better than logicians
[ibid., 58].”
Finally, Dupin uses the games he has analyzed to clear up the riddle of the pur-
loined letter. He knows that M, who is a “poet and mathematician” [PL, 453], can play
c or n. Upon the decisive evidence, obtained by G, that the letter “is not hidden within
the limits of that dignitary’s ordinary search” [ibid., 458], Dupin conjectures rightly
that the letter is “full in the view of every visitor” [ibid., 459], and he wins the play.
If both players are equally intelligent, “even and odd” is a static game that is
classically used to motivate the notion of mixed strategy equilibrium: the only stable
situation is one in which each player randomizes between his two pure strategies,
assigning equal probability to each. However, there is no evidence that Poe under-
stood the notion of a mixed strategy in PL [Brams, 1994a, 37; 1994b, 62-65]. Actually,
Poe makes one player smarter than the other and assumes “that an extremely clever
boy could always calculate exactly how far ahead less clever opponents would reason
[ibid.].” He gives Dupin greater powers of observation and superior mind. So, he ren-
ders things simple and gets a tidy result.
More realistic games are embedded in MRM and MMR, which both deal with
death and violence.
Dupin versus murderers
In MRM, Dupin makes the conjecture that it is an orang-outang that murdered
Madame Lespanaye and her daughter. He is aware that his guesses are open to criti-
cism: “I will not pursue these guesses – for I have no right to call them more – since
the shades of reflection upon which they are based are scarcely of sufficient depth to
be appreciable by my own intellect, and since I could not pretend to make them intel-
ligible to the understanding of another [MRM, 368].” Dupin wants to add a proof by the
use of a witness to his proof by the use of reason.
To this end, Dupin decides to advertise in the newspaper Le Monde. He assumes
that the owner of the animal is a sailor belonging to a Maltese vessel, and he wants to
make this man believe that he “may have the animal again, upon identifying it satis-
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Figure 1 is the extensive-form representation of this non-cooperative dynamic
game of complete and perfect information. In this figure, D and S denote respectively
Dupin and the sailor owning the murderer orang-outang. D may affirm (a), or not (n),
he knows that the man he searches for “is ascertained to be a sailor, belonging to a
Maltese vessel [ibid.].” S may answer (a) or not (n) Dupin’s advertisement. D wants to
find the clue to the riddle: he earns 1, if he achieves his purpose, and 0, if he fails. S
does not want “to attract attention” [ibid., 369] either to himself or to the beast: he
earns 1, if he achieves his purpose, and loses 1, if he fails. If D plays a, it is in the
interest of S to play a: “Should I avoid claiming a property of so great value, which is
known that I possess, I will render the animal at least, liable to suspicion [ibid.].” If D
plays n, it is in the interest of S to play n, in order to remain in the background. The
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game is the following combination of strategies: D
plays a; S plays a if D plays a, and plays n if D plays n. This equilibrium is what is
lurking beneath the end of MRM: D and S really play a.
FIGURE 1
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In MMR, which is an attempt to solve an actual murder case, a young girl named
Marie Rogêt disappears and, four days later, her corpse is found floating in the river.
The newspapers pick up the story and build up numerous theories. “Piqued by the
failure of all his endeavors to ferret out the assassins” [MMR, 382], the Prefect en-
gages the services of Dupin, who sets to work at once.
In order to avoid falling into the trap of information cascades, Dupin procures “a
full report of all the evidence elicited” [ibid., 383], and he eliminates, one by one, the
various newspapers’ theories. Last, Dupin disproves the conjecture according to which
Marie has been the victim of a gang of desperadoes: “I shall add but one to the argu-
ments against a gang; but this one has, to my own understanding at least, a weight
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don to any king’s evidence, it is not to be imagined, for a moment, that some member
of a gang of low ruffians, or of any body of men, would not long ago have betrayed his
accomplices. Each one of a gang, so placed, is not so much greedy of reward, or anx-
ious for escape, as fearful of betrayal. He betrays eagerly and early that he may not
himself be betrayed. That the secret has not been divulged is the very best of proof
that it is, in fact, a secret. The horrors of this dark deed are known only to one, or two,
living human beings, and to God [ibid., 432-433].”
After summing up this analysis, Dupin attains the idea of a murder perpetrated by
“the ‘naval officer’ who is first known to have led the unfortunate into crime [ibid.,
433].”
Of course, Dupin’s refutation of the gang theory is questionable. It cannot be
overlooked that, “most frequently, gangs use punishment as a deterrent to attempts
to exit [Sieberg, 2001, 114].” Thus, blackguards may be reluctant to betray one an-
other, for fear of retaliation, and cooperation with one another can be achieved. Yet,
gangs are “distinct from ephemeral teams of bandits or robbers who join together for
the accomplishment of a specific task, after which the team disbands” [Skaperdas,
1998, 198], and, in the theory according to which Marie has been the victim of a gang
of desperadoes, the word “gang” denotes actually such an ephemeral team of bandits,
who do not fear that betraying will have bad consequences in the future.
Thus, the few lines quoted above show Poe’s ability to use, in certain key-parts of
his detective work, a rigorous game theoretic chain of reasoning that is based upon
the Nash equilibrium of the very famous “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” That such a Nash
equilibrium – each player betrays – has not been implemented is the proof that the
murder of Marie Rogêt is an outrage committed by a single individual. Before Poe,
Herodotus described an early example of the reasoning in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in
the conspiracy of Darius against the Magus Smerdis [Rasmusen, 1989, 38]. Post hoc,
ergo propter hoc? It’s anyone’s guess how deeply Poe understood multi person deci-
sion problems, but there is at least a famous game in MRM, and this game helps
Dupin to find the clue to the riddle.
From a game-theoretic point of view, the investigations made by Dupin, as a
fictional sleuth, in each one of Poe’s three detective stories are worthwhile. But we
must not lose sight of this trilogy as a whole and of Dupin as a negotiator.
GAME THEORY AND POE’S TRILOGY AS A WHOLE
Poe endowed Dupin “with everything that he himself lacked [van Doren Stern,
1977, 330].” Poe “was all his life a starveling poet [ibid., xvi].” Dupin is not wealthy, but
enjoys some independent means: “by courtesy of his creditors, there still remained in
his possession a small remnant of his patrimony; and, upon the income arising from
this, he managed, by means of a rigorous economy, to procure the necessaries of life,
without troubling himself about its superfluities [MRM, 336].” Poe made little or noth-
ing from the publication of his writings: he was “a miserably paid writer for ephemeral
magazines [van Doren Stern, 1977, xvi].” Dupin makes money from his abilities.
A bargaining game between Dupin and Prefect G, which spans across the three
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In the last pages of MRM, Dupin gives G the solution of the tragedy in the “Rue
Morgue.” Dupin asks nothing of G, but he does not explain to G “the simple character
of those inductions by which he has disentangled the mystery [MMR, 378].” Moreover,
Dupin does not reveal to G that Lebon, who had been wrongly imprisoned, once ren-
dered him a service for which he is “not ungrateful” [MRM, 352], and that the release
of this clerk rewards his efforts. Dupin acquires for him “the credit of intuition” [MMR,
379], and he becomes “the cynosure of the political eyes [ibid.].” At the end of MRM,
the fact that Dupin has strong analytical abilities is common knowledge between Dupin
and G. Following Aumann [1976], we say that a fact is common knowledge among the
players if every player knows it, every player knows that every player knows it, and so
on…
In MMR, G engages the services of Dupin, and he makes “him a direct, and cer-
tainly a liberal proposition [MMR, 382].” Dupin accepts this proposition at once, “al-
though its advantages were altogether provisional [ibid., 383].” Dupin finds the clue to
the riddle, and “the Prefect fulfills punctually, although with reluctance, the terms of
his compact with the Chevalier [ibid., 437].” At the end of MMR, the fact that G is
willing to pay for a service is common knowledge between Dupin and G.
In PL, Dupin and G play a two-stage negotiation game of complete but imperfect
information. Table 2 represents this bargaining game, which looks like the bank-run
game analyzed by Gibbons [1992, 73-75].
TABLE 2
The Normal-Form Representation of the Dupin / Prefect Game
   
Prefect 
  
s  k 
a m, M-m* 0,  0 
 
Dupin 
w  ε, M-ε  Next Stage** 
Stage 1 
   
Prefect 
  
s  k 
a 50, 2M-50** 0, 0 
 
Dupin 
w  ε, 2M-ε  0, 0 
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In the first stage, M denotes the “enormous” [PL, 444] reward that the Queen
would give to G if he could obtain her the purloined letter. Dupin may arouse (a) G to
a small offer m, or wait and see (w). Of course, 0 < m < M. G may share the reward (s)
or keep it (k). In the second stage, the alternatives are the same for both players, but
the reward offered by the Queen has been “doubled”, and G wouldn’t mind giving his
individual check “for fifty thousand francs to anyone who could obtain” him the letter
[ibid., 448]. In the second stage, there is a unique Nash equilibrium: Dupin plays a,
and G plays s, leading to a payoff of (50, 2M – 50). Assuming that there is no discount-
ing, we can substitute this payoff into the normal-form game of the first stage. This
one-period version of the two-period game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria. In
the first one, Dupin plays a, and G plays s, leading to a payoff of (m, M – m). In the
second equilibrium, Dupin plays w, and G plays k, leading to a payoff of (50, 2M – 50).
Consequently, the negotiation game has two outcomes: on the one hand, Dupin plays
a, and G plays s in the first stage, yielding payoffs of (m, M – m); on the other hand,
Dupin plays w, and G plays k in the first stage, next they play respectively a and s in
the second stage, yielding payoffs of (50, 2M – 50). The second of these two outcomes
of the negotiation game, that Pareto-dominates the first one, is the outcome of PL,
since G “really” [ibid., 449] gives fifty thousand francs to Dupin.
In “The Philosophy of Composition” [PC], which is an ex post facto attempt to
define the way he wrote “The Raven”, Poe affirms that “every plot, worth the name,
must be elaborated to its dénouement before anything be attempted with the pen [PC,
549-550].” This rule that Poe implemented in each and every Dupin story is similar to
the basic rule of strategic behavior: “look ahead and reason back [Dixit and Nalebuff,
1991, 34].” That probably contributes to explaining why Poe’s detective stories can be
used to illustrate game-theoretic concepts.
Similarly, Poe’s letters contain unique and detailed information regarding behav-
ior in strategic situations. More precisely, these letters, as well as the three Dupin
stories, provide another laboratory in which to examine the relevance of the game-
theoretic approach. We mine these letters for their game-theoretic ideas. This en-
ables us to picture Poe as he really was, and to understand him in contrast with his
environment.
GAME THEORY AND THE TURNING POINTS IN POE’S LIFE
Of all American writers’ lives, Poe’s life is “the most fascinating [Van Doren Stern,
1977, xvii].” Two decisions of Poe had a great impact on his life: the first one is Poe’s
decision, as a young man, to leave his foster father’s home; the second one is Poe’s
last try, as a forty-year-old man, to fight off the hold that alcohol had on him. Both
these decisions are consistent with game-theoretic behavior.
Poe versus himself
At the age of seventeen, Poe was sent to the University of Virginia. During his
stay at the University, his foster father, John Allan, gave him just enough money to
live on. With his fellow students, the sons of wealthy planters, Poe took to gambling.105 GAME THEORY AND POE'S DETECTIVE STORIES AND LIFE
He lost and gambled again to recoup his losses, but he failed. In December 1826, Allan
refused to let Poe return to the University of Virginia because bills were presented
him for payment. Then, in March 1827, Poe abruptly left his foster father’s home, and
he sailed from Richmond to go to Boston. On December 1st, 1828, Poe wrote John
Allan explaining his departure from home, nearly two years before, and his enlist-
ment in the army as a common soldier, as follows: “I have thrown myself on the world,
like the Norman Conqueror on the shores of Britain &, by my avowed assurance of
victory, have destroyed the fleet which could alone cover my retreat – I must either
conquer or die – succeed or be disgraced [Ostrom, 1966, 10].”
There is a difference between games and decision problems. In a decision prob-
lem, the single decision-maker cannot gain by reducing his action set (or the quality of
his information), or decreasing his payoff to some outcomes. In a game, there are
several decision-makers, and such commitments can be of value: for example, a player
can benefit from the opportunity to make a binding commitment to play in a certain
way, since by committing himself to a given sequence of actions he may be able to
alter the play of his opponents, provided that they are aware of this change [Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991, 75].
Two famous examples highlight this theme of the value of commitment: William
the Conqueror destroying his ships as a commitment not to retreat, and Odysseus
lashing himself to the mast and stopping his men’s ears with wax as a commitment
not to go to the Sirens’ island.
Both these stories show that the search for a way to commit oneself can lead to
the use of actions that would not otherwise been considered. A difference between the
conquest of England and the story of Odysseus is worth noting. In the conquest of
England, William the Conqueror faces an enemy. Destroying his ships gave him two
advantages: first, his own soldiers were united, since desertion or retreat was an
impossibility; second, the enemy’s soldiers lost heart because they knew that William
had made an unconditional commitment to fight rather than to retreat, and that he
must either succeed or perish, while they had the option to retreat into the hinter-
land. In the story of Odysseus, there is only one person. However, the natural way to
model this story is with two players corresponding to Odysseus before and Odysseus
after he is exposed to the Sirens, because Odysseus has evolving preferences, and he
may be considered to be a different player at each period.
Poe thought that he was “like the Norman Conqueror on the shores of Britain.”
Poe was wrong: actually, he was not like William the Conqueror, because “the wide
world” on which he threw himself was not concerned with Poe’s behavior in any way.
On the other hand, Poe, as well as Odysseus, was like a person who faces the “drug
problem … [and] … may take or not drugs at the first period and either go on or give
up at the second [Walliser, 1988, 182].” The diet problem [Luce and Raiffa, 1957, 75]
and the smoking problem [Schelling, 1963, 123] are two other famous examples of
games in which a person plays against himself.
Figure 2 shows the extensive-form representation of the non-cooperative dynamic
game of Odysseus (Poe).
In this figure, O1 and O2 denote respectively Odysseus before and Odysseus after
he hears the singing of the Sirens. Similarly, P1 and P2 denote respectively Poe before106 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 2
The Extensive-Form Representation of the Game of Odysseus (Poe)
and Poe after he enjoys a life of leisure. In the first period, O1 may hear the singing of
the Sirens (h), or not (n), and P1 may live as a Virginia gentleman (g), or not (n). If O1
plays h, O2 may play either continue (c) or stop (s) at the second period. If P1 plays g, P2
may play either c or s at the second period. In the first period Odysseus prefers hear-
ing the singing of the Sirens and stopping later to not hearing this song, a strategy
itself preferred to hearing the singing of the Sirens and continuing. But in the second
period, he is addicted to this song and that constraint may be interpreted as a strong
preference to staying to hear the enchanting sweetness of the singing of the Sirens. In
the first period Poe prefers living as a Virginia gentleman and stopping later to not
living as a Virginia gentleman, a strategy itself preferred to living as a Virginia gentle-
man for ever. But in the second period, he is addicted to idleness, and that constraint
may be interpreted as a strong preference to staying to have a life of leisure.
In such a game, three behaviors are possible: the “myopic” behavior where the
individual "optimizes separately at each period," the “committed” behavior where he
"chooses in the first period the best actions for the two periods," and the “sophisti-
cated” behavior where he "perfectly expects his future change in preferences and
computes his move by backward induction [Walliser, 1988, 183]." The outcomes ob-
tained by these three behaviors are respectively (0, 3), (2, 1), and (1, x). In the games
illustrated in Figure 2, the (2, 1) outcome occurs. Odysseus manages to achieve a
credible commitment by taking a collateral action: he orders his sailors to plug their
ears with wax, and they bind him hands and feet to the mast. So he hears the singing
of the Sirens and passes them. Poe managed to achieve a credible commitment by
taking a collateral action: he left his foster father’s home. So, after enjoying a life of
leisure, he started to work hard.
For achieving credible commitments, many devices may be used [Dixit and Nalebuff,
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Odysseus uses this device. Poe, as a young man, did likewise. Both of these stories
correspond to a total commitment: the cost of escaping from the mast or turning back
is taken to be infinite. On August 1849, in order to free himself from the hold that
alcohol had on him, Poe, as a forty-year-old man, used a partial commitment, which
increased the cost of giving way to the temptation without making it infinite.
Poe versus Spirit of Southern Conviviality
Alcohol was a dangerous stimulant for Poe. He returned to it again and again,
sometimes after long periods of abstention. Many theories, for example, rational ad-
diction, could explain Poe’s alcohol problem. However, in a letter that he wrote on
April 1, 1841, to Dr. Snodgrass, Poe explains his drinking habits: “At no period of my
life was I ever what men call intemperate. I never was in the habit of intoxication. I
never drank drams, &c. But, for a brief period, while I resided in Richmond, and
edited the Messenger I certainly did give way, at long intervals, to the temptation held
out on all sides by the spirit of Southern conviviality. My sensitive temperament could
not stand an excitement which was an everyday matter to my companions. In short, it
happened that I was completely intoxicated [van Doren Stern, 1977, 16].”
In a society where conviviality was a matter of course, to refuse to drink with an
acquaintance was almost an insult, and only a few were good enough friends to help
Poe in his struggle against dipsomania. Poe thought that if people did not tempt him,
he would not fall. So, in July or August 1849, after his reception in the Shockoe Hill
Division, no. 54, of the Sons of Temperance, Poe took a temperance pledge, and pub-
lished it in local newspapers, in order that shame irremediably swooped on him if he
flagged. He acted so because he trusted neither himself nor others and because he had
true confidence only in shame.
Table 3a represents the problem Poe faced, before he took his temperance oath,
and published this pledge in local papers.
In this bi-matrix, Poe (P) faces “the spirit of Southern conviviality”(S). Actually, S
denotes a society where conviviality is a matter of course, i.e., a society where to
refuse to drink with an acquaintance is almost an insult. S, whom P knows to have
extremely good predictive powers, is assumed to have made a prediction about what P
will decide. P has a choice between two actions: sticking to an abstinence rule (r) or
using his own discretion (d). If S expects P to play r, S does not offer P any drinks (n).
If S expects P to play d, S offers P some drinks (o). P’s payoff is the sum of two
elements: P obtains 1 if he does not stick to an abstinence rule and 2 if S does not
tempt him. From P’s viewpoint, the best situation is (d, n): free will without any
temptation. Next come (r, n), and (d, o): abstinence rule without any temptation, and
immoderate use of drinks. The worst situation is (r, o): Tantalus torture. S is sensitive
only to the rightness of his expectation: his gain is assumed to be 3 or 0 according to
whether his expectations are correct or not.
The matrix of this game is quite identical to the matrix of the Newcomb’s problem
that describes a decision-maker (D) and a Genius (G). D has enormous confidence in
G’s power to predict D’s choices. D has before him two closed boxes: B1 and B2. B1
contains $1 and B2 contains either $2 or nothing. D does not know the content of B2.108 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
He has to choose either B2 only (a) or both boxes (b). If G expects D to play a, G puts
$2 in B2 (f). If G expects D to play b, G leaves B2 empty (e). In all cases, B1 contains $1.
TABLE 3a
The Normal-Form Representation of the
Poe (Decision-maker) / Spirit of Southern Conviviality (Genius)
Game without public abstinence oath
In the heart of this problem long-discussed by Nozick [1997], there is a conflict
between the expected-utility principle, which prescribes playing the first-row strat-
egy, and the dominance principle, which prescribes playing the second-row strategy.
All his life Poe played the second-row strategy, and S played the second-column
strategy. Poe’s public oath of abstinence and its publication in local papers in the
summer immediately prior to his death, i.e., a commitment move to change future
behavior, got Poe out of that quandary for several months.
Table 3b represents the problem Poe faced, after he took his temperance oath,
and published this pledge in local papers. In such a situation, the shame that Poe
TABLE 3b
The Normal-Form Representation of the Poe / Spirit of
Southern Conviviality Game with public abstinence oath
would have endured if he had fallen off reduces the gains generated by the strategy d
if S plays o, and there is no conflict between the expected-utility principle and the
dominance principle. The latter becomes irrelevant. The former prescribes playing
the first-row strategy. So Poe played this strategy, and S played n: “There had been no
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However, Poe’s state of grace did not go on, for his pledge was not irrevocable. It
was a partial commitment, which increased the cost of giving way to the temptation
without making it infinite. It was enough that Poe left Richmond, to get back to the
initial game. He did so on September 27, 1849, when he took the steamer sailing to
Baltimore.
CONCLUSION
Two points are worth noting. First it is not just Poe who made, in a manner of
speaking, game theorists of his characters. The same can be said of Shakespeare and
many earlier writers. In this respect, Hamlet [Brams, 1994b], Macbeth and Aristophanes’
Lysistrata [ibid., 1997], or Old Testament [ibid., (1980) 2003] are convincing examples.
Moreover, contemporary authors do so too. Brams and Jones [1999] analyze such an
example: Joseph Heller’s novel Catch 22. Second it is not just game theory that can be
applied to literature. The theory of moves [Brams, 1994b] supplements standard game
theory in enabling one better to model asymmetries between players, including fic-
tional ones, even though this new theory is rather controversial [Stone, 2001, and
Brams, 2001]. However, detective stories are a fertile ground for humanistic applica-
tions of game theory, and Poe’s trilogy marks the birth of this new genre of literature.
In addition, Poe’s letters contain unique and detailed information regarding behavior
in strategic situations. Therefore, in each of Poe’s three detective stories featuring
Dupin, in the Dupin trilogy as a whole, and in two pivotal episodes of Poe’s life – Poe’s
decision to leave Allan’s home as a young man and to publish a temperance oath
twenty years later – behavior can be profitably analyzed in terms of game theory.
NOTES
The inspiration for this paper came from reading Georges Théodule Guilbaud’s works. We owe a
great debt to him. While working on this paper we have been fortunate to receive encouragement
from Deirdre N. McCloskey. Earlier versions of this paper have greatly benefited from comments
received at the Eastern Economic Association meetings 2002 and 2003. In addition, we would like
to acknowledge the judicious and detailed critical comments of Steven J. Brams, three anonymous
referees and Kenneth J. Koford. As the editor of this journal, Ken spent much time bringing our
writing skills up to the necessary level. We miss him so much. Yves Gaudillat has focused on good
English style and clear wording. We thank all of them. They should be absolved of blame for the
deficiencies that remain in this paper. We bear sole responsibility for the content of this paper, and
any remaining errors are our own.
1. We take all quotations of Poe’s works from The Portable Poe [Van Doren Stern, 1977].
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